The Centennial History of the American Civil War: Vol. I, The Coming Fury by Bruce Catton
The drift of events carry their own hard logic, and such was the case during the months between April 1860, when the Democratic party split over the nomination of Stephen Douglas, to July 1961 when armies of the North and South met in battle at Bull Run/Manassas. People in both the North and the South, in various factions and groups within those sections made many choices during those months, not really understanding or appreciating the possible consequences, or how others might react. Only the first major battle of the Civil War would finally reveal what the choices and decisions of the previous months had wrought.
Catton clearly believes the primary issue behind the many choices and decisions which led to war was the issue of slavery and its extension into the new territories, but his narration of the events on 1860-61 makes it plain that there really is no other explanation. Yes, there were cultural difference between the sections; there were tensions going back as far as the English Civil War; there were old wounds like the tariff issue, but the southern economy, certainly that of the cotton states, was so dependent on the peculiar institution that even maintaining it in the slave states was not enough, it had to be extended, or the cotton kingdom would face ruin. The extension of slavery was so vital that many in the South convinced themselves that their rights were being trampled on by those who sought to oppose that extension, and even by those who sought a compromise solution.
The catalyst of the coming fury was not the nomination and election of Lincoln as one might suppose. Rather, it was the split of the Democratic Party and the nominations of Douglas and John Breckinridge. Douglas was unacceptable to Southern Democrats because of his statement on "Popular Sovereignty" give during the Lincoln-Douglas debates and because of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Douglas "had given foreknowledge of an unendurable truth -- that slavery would die unless the outside world dropped all other concerns to prop it up, which was obviously impossible."
Lincoln might have been "the black-visaged enemy who threatened to upset everything the South lived by" but Douglas was "the apostate, the turncoat, the former friend who appeared on the other side when the pinch came. Douglas was more menacing because he bore no ill-will. In his position, in this summer of 1860, the slavery system could read its own sentence of ultimate death. To get away from him, the men who had Southern sentiment in their control had determined that the choice would be between the Black Republicans and disunion." And at least some in the south appeared almost to wish for a Republican victory so that secession would follow.
But even these events might not have led to war if not for additional events in seceded South Carolina surrounding Fort Sumter. South Carolina could have occupied the fort within days of its secession without a fight, for it was unfinished and unoccupied. But as the federal government in Washington was spending money to construct, the newly declared nation that was South Carolina, and then including the states that followed her, elected to wait until the fort was finished before taking it. A mighty large wrench was thrown into the situation, however, when a Union major decided to abandon a fort which he could not defend and occupy Fort Sumter, which at least was more defensible. The drift of events had launched North and South on an unexpected course, one which could only lead to Bull Run/Manassas.
Fantastic book!
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Terrible Swift Sword: The Centennial History of the Civil War Series, Volume 2 by Bruce Catton
The second book in this award-winning trilogy impressively shows how the Union and Confederacy, slowly and inexorably, reconciled themselves to an all-out war.
Catton tells the story of the Civil War as never before -- of two turning points which changed the scope and meaning of the war. First, he describes how the war slowly but steadily got out of control. This would not be the neat, short, “limited” war both sides had envisioned. And then the author reveals how the sweeping force of all-out conflict changed the war’s purpose, in turning it into a war for human freedom.
At first, it was not even much of a fight. Cautious generals; inexperienced, incompetent, or jealous administrators; shortages of good people and supplies; excess of both gloom and optimism, kept each side from swinging into decisive action. As the buildup began, there were maddening delays. The earliest engagements were halting and inconclusive. As the war meanders after Bull Run, so does the story, but both the war and the story begin to change when General Ulysses S. Grant begins his approach to Forts Henry and Donelson.
With more victories in the west, and the capture of Atlantic ports to enable a naval blockade, the danger for the South grows critical. It took more time in the east, with the Army of the Potomac residing too long near Washington, but eventually General George B. McClellan (who is impaled in these pages on the arrogant words of his letters) begins his peninsula campaign. As the army closes in on Richmond, it appears that victory is near. But the tide turns as General Robert E. Lee is elevated to command of what he would call the Army of Northern Virginia.
By August 1862, both sides had heard the trumpet that would never call retreat. The peace-makers could not be heard until the terrible swift sword had been sheathed; but the scabbard had been thrown away, and now the Confederacy was carrying the war north of the Potomac River.
Excellent.
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Never Call Retreat by Bruce Catton
The final volume of Bruce Catton's monumental Centennial History of the Civil War traces the war from Fredericksburg through the succeeding grim and relentless campaigns to the Courthouse at Appomattox and the death of Lincoln.
This is an eloquent study of the bitterest years of the war when death slashed the country with a brutality unparalleled in the history of the United States. Through the kaleidoscope tone and temper of the struggle, two men, different in stature, but similar in dedication to their awesome tasks, grappled with the burden of being leaders both in politics and war.
In the north Lincoln remained resolute in the belief that a house divided against itself could not stand. His determination and uncanny vision of the destiny of the country and its people far transcended the plaguing tensions, fears, and frustrations of his cabinet and Congress. Mr. Lincoln’s use of vast resources is brilliantly contrasted to Davis’s valiant struggle for political and economic stability in a hopelessly fragmented and underdeveloped south.
Though Davis never lacked for spirit and dedication, his handicaps were severe. This was not a war to be won by static ideals and romanticism. As Mr. Lincoln managed to expand and intensify the ideals that sustained the Northern war effort, Mr. Davis was never able to enlarge the South’s. This was a war to be won by flexibility in thought, strength in supplies, and battles. And so they were fought -- Fredericksburg, The Wilderness, Chancellorsville, Vicksburg, Gettysburg.
Excellent.